COMPUTER SCIENCE SEMINAR -Thursday, April 11, 1996 Tuomas Sandholm, Dept. Comp. Sci., Univ. Massachusetts at Amherst, will speak on ``Negotiation among Computationally Limited Self-Interested Agents''. TIME: 11:00 a.m.- 12:00 p.m. ROOM: DC 1302 ABSTRACT In multiagent systems, computational agents make contracts on behalf of the real world parties that they represent. The significance of such systems is likely to increase due to the developing communication infrastructure, the advent of electronic commerce, and the industrial trend toward outsourcing. My research normatively analyses such negotiations among agents that try to maximize payoff without concern for the global good. The most advanced normative theoretical tools available are game theoretic. However, in game theory full rationality of the agents is usually assumed. My work extends these normative approaches to settings in which computational limitations restrict each agent's rationality because combinatorial complexity precludes enumerating and evaluating all possible outcomes. Within the subfield of automated contracting, I extended the contract net framework to work among self-interested agents. The original contract net lacked a formal model for making bidding and awarding decisions, while in my TRACONET system these decisions are based on marginal cost calculations. I developed an iterative scheme for anytime task reallocation where agents pay each other for handling tasks. I uncovered and solved problems regarding contracting while old bids are pending. I constructed three new contract operators and proved that they are necessary and sufficient for reaching a globally optimal task allocation in a finite number of contracts. I also proved that a leveled commitment contracting protocol enables contracts that are impossible via classical full commitment contracts. In addition, it enhances the efficiency of contracts when full commitment contracts are possible. Finally, I identified and solved problems of distributed asynchronous implementation. Within coalition formation, I developed a normative theory that states which self-interested computationally limited agents should form coalitions and which coalition structures are stable. These prescriptions depend on the performance profiles of the agents' problem solving algorithms, and differ significantly from those for fully rational agents. My theory includes an application independent domain classification with bounded rational agents, and relates it to two traditional domain classifications with fully rational agents. Within contract execution, unenforced exchange methods are desirable among computational agents because litigation is difficult. I developed such a method based on splitting the exchange into chunks that are delivered one at a time. I developed two chunking algorithms as well as a nontrivial sound and complete quadratic chunk sequencing algorithm. I also derived the optimal stable strategies for carrying out the exchange. Finally, I analyzed the role of real-time and developed deadline methods that do not themselves require enforcement. I evaluated these domain independent methods on an NP-complete distributed vehicle routing problem with large-scale instances collected from five real-world dispatch centers. My methods resulted in significant transportation cost savings on this problem where classical game theoretic techniques are inapplicable due to intractability. COMPUTER SCIENCE SEMINAR -Monday, April 8, 1996 Darrell Raymond, University of Western Ontario, will speak on ``Using Partial Orders to Manage Software''. TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. ROOM: DC 1302 ABSTRACT Programmers have long relied on tools like make and RCS to assist in managing medium-sized software projects. The usefulness of these tools is compromised by the idiosyncracies and gratuitous differences of their various implementations. What is lacking is a general model of the process of building, versioning, and configuring software. Such a model could serve as a benchmark for comparing software tools, and would provide a language with which to describe semantics independently of implementations. In this talk I present the beginnings of such a model, based on an algebra for partial orders. We will see that building programs can be usefully expressed algebraically, and that such expressions suggest more general and fruitful approaches to the problem of managing software.
Logging off workstations when not in use